

whole new area which requires thinking and negotiations. The trend towards regionalism is, however, a worldwide one, and one which I think we should welcome. The most advanced continent in this respect is, of course, Europe, where the 45-year great divide between East and West has been erased, where the Warsaw Pact alliance has been dissolved and where CSCE has taken on new responsibilities. Our Malaysian colleague Mohamed Jawhar was quite right when he said we should not mistake the situation in Europe and think that CSCE caused all these wonderful things to happen rather than that it is the product of the ongoing political process. Our Asian colleagues rightly warned us that circumstances in Europe are very different from circumstances in Asia and in the Asia-Pacific region. We should therefore not think that, because CSCE has succeeded in Europe, one can simply transplant such an institution to the Asia-Pacific region.

Jusuf Wanandi, Lau Teik Soon, Choo Eng Guan and others drew our attention to the fact that there is a very close nexus between politics and economics. If you look at the economics of this region, you not only see dynamic economies but, what is even more remarkable and not very well known outside of the Asia-Pacific region, the tremendous burst in recent years of intraregional trade, intraregional investment, the regionalization of manufacturing, the relaxation of political tensions, the opening of political dialogues and the emerging sense of an Asia-Pacific community. All of this, I think, underpins the views of my ASEAN colleagues that we should do two things. First, we should strengthen ASEAN and cautiously seek, on certain assumptions, to expand the membership of ASEAN to include the other four States in South-East Asia. Second, we should expand the ASEAN PMC process to include the other major countries in the Asia-Pacific region. A third suggestion, made by Australia and supported by Jusuf Wanandi, was that the time has come for the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to begin

cautiously and realistically confidence-building measures and consultations on security cooperation.

HISASHI OWADA

I certainly agree with your initial remark that the two Co-Chairmen should not try to sum up. A ten-minute summary would certainly do injustice to an intensive three-day discussion. But I would also add that I am in an impossible position to try to complement and supplement Tommy Koh's comments. With his usual, characteristic completeness, he has covered all the ground and he has not left even a small portion for me to dig into.

Nevertheless, I am obligated to say something as a Co-Chairman of this symposium. In doing so, I shall do injustice to the group and to the Co-Chairman by expressing some of my personal views, perhaps biased views, about some of the salient points which have emerged in the discussion.

While the subject-matter of the discussion was the changing role of the United Nations in conflict resolution and peace-keeping, we did not assign a particular session to the background of this theme. In the course of the discussion, many speakers nevertheless touched upon this question. One important factor which we had to assess was East-West relations, referred to more optimistically by some than by others. To what extent this factor will augur well for the future of the United Nations is a matter of subjective assessment. Some people would say that it will bring about a totally new era in which the United Nations is a quasi-panacea for the problems we face. My impression is that the majority of the participants felt otherwise.

A second background factor is the degree of interdependence of the international community. Participants have referred to the environment, drugs, terrorism, and so forth. These questions are very much in the picture when we talk

in general terms about the changing role of the United Nations. But they also affect, to my mind, the outlook for UN activities in conflict resolution and peace-keeping.

A third factor, closely related to the second, is the growing uncertainty about the demarcation between so-called internal problems and external problems, or, stated differently, problems of international concern and problems falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. There is a clear recognition among the group that the United Nations will increasingly face this question in relation to conflict resolution.

The second point I would like to make is the range of possible UN activities in conflict resolution and peace-keeping. Olara Otunnu referred to a three-tiered approach, which I thought was very useful. He mentioned the persuasion phase, where conflict resolution could be tried mainly through diplomatic channels and through the means enumerated in Article 33 of the Charter. But in that connection, of course, the matter is not limited to Article 33. The role of the Secretary-General and the role of the Security Council have also been referred to. We did not, however, get into the question of the composition of the Security Council in relation to the changing realities of the international community and the changing role of the United Nations. This is something we might be able to discuss in a wider context.

The role of the General Assembly in this connection was also touched upon, but not fully. It was discussed in relation to a very interesting question, which is: to what extent is the Uniting for Peace resolution applicable? Formally speaking, of course, the resolution is very much alive. But we might explore to what extent the Uniting for Peace resolution will be relevant to UN activities in light of the current political and social reality.

The role of the judicial organs of the United Nations, particularly the International Court of Justice, was also men-

tionally touched upon in relation to the possibility that the Secretary-General, like the other UN organs, should be able to ask the Court for an advisory opinion. Perhaps the role of the Court in UN conflict resolution could be even greater. We did not go into this question, but it is something we should try to keep in mind.

The third major point that I would like to touch upon is the area of peace-keeping which lies somewhere between Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. The elaboration given by Marrack Goulding was very useful in considering the enlarged scope of UN peace-keeping activities. The distinction between the traditional type and the new type of operation is very useful as we deal with a wide range of situations where a harmonious mix of the civilian component and the military component would be necessary and desirable. In that context, the Cambodian question is extremely relevant, as Rafeeuddin Ahmed has told us. It is also important to keep in mind that the political elements and the technical elements have to be balanced. In that respect, perhaps more ingenuity will be required in future peace-keeping operations.

We also marginally touched upon the question of the financial implications of peace-keeping operations. It is quite true, as Marrack Goulding has said, that if you compare the potential cost incurred should a peace-keeping operation not take place with the actual cost of an operation, then quite clearly the cost of peace-keeping is very reasonable. At the same time, if you compare the cost of peace-keeping with the regular budget of the United Nations, then the cost of peace-keeping activity is not negligible. I am not saying that we should be careful about spending too much on peace-keeping. Rather, because UN peace-keeping activity is so important, we should address ourselves more seriously to the question of the systematic financing of peace-keeping operations.

In regard to my fourth point, the question of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter, one has to think in two

different directions. First, where do you draw the line between internal problems and external problems? The distinction has been drawn in the doctrine of international law that there is no such thing as a matter which falls exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. It is a relative notion. As legitimate international concern grows, the field of application of domestic jurisdiction narrows. In that sense, to talk about internal and external problems as if there were a clear-cut categorical distinction seems to be somewhat moot and doubtful. In any case, deciding where to draw the line is going to be much more difficult as the role of the United Nations expands and the objective need for the United Nations to intervene grows.

That brings me to the second branch of the problem, that is to say, where do you draw the line when the matter is essentially domestic and internal but the United Nations has been requested to intervene. This is a different kind of problem from the classical one that I referred to earlier. I think that, here again, a closer look would be desirable.

My final point is the question of regional arrangements in relation to the activity of the United Nations. My own feeling is that this question has not been sufficiently dealt with either in the doctrine or the practice of the United Nations, primarily because it has been seen as an exception to the basic rule. When the Charter was established in 1945, Chapter VIII ("Regional Arrangements") was written primarily to take account of the existing inter-American system. From that point of view, it was more or less a concession. Our thinking now can be in more positive terms, depending upon how one assesses the activities of exist-

ing regional organizations and the potential activities of organizations which might emerge, for example in the Asia-Pacific region. While we discussed this topic extensively, we did not examine it intensively. A lot more thinking will be needed for that purpose.

JOE SILLS

It would be pretentious for me to try to add to these two excellent summaries. I will just express to our two Co-Chairmen our appreciation for them.

I began the session by thanking The Institute of Policy Studies, as well as the Governments of Japan and Singapore, for their sponsorship of this symposium. I would like to close by once again repeating this. I would also like to thank our two Co-Chairmen.

When you consider that two such prominent individuals have taken three days' time away from pressing duties and demanding schedules to dedicate to this meeting, and when you consider that the other 61 participants around this table have done likewise, I can only conclude that our Co-Chairmen and all of you gave this time because you share our conviction of the importance of UN peace-making and peace-keeping. By implication, this means that you share our belief that the United Nations is an indispensable institution which needs to be made stronger and more effective in the future. If I may be so bold as to speak for my colleagues in the United Nations, this is for us a source of great satisfaction.

So, thank you all once again.

